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Abstract 
We propose a model to show how the fee structure of listed Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) can increase instead of decrease Management Company opportunistic 
behaviors. Distinguishing between performance fees paid on the fund market value 
and management fees paid either on the Net Asset Value (NAV) or on the Gross Asset 
Value (GAV), we show that only the former aligns the Management Company and 
shareholder  interests.  In  particular,  we  demonstrate  that  management  fees  lead 
Management Companies to make suboptimal financing and investment decisions in 
order  to  maximize  their  own  wealth  at  the  expense  of  shareholders.  We  test  the 
predictions of the model empirically using a panel of Italian listed REITs. 
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 1  Introduction 
This paper focuses on the relationship among the REIT fee structure and the two primary Management 
Company decision variables: debt issues and investments. A fee structure based on NAV or GAV may lead 
Management Companies to suboptimal investment and financing decisions. This specific topic belongs to the 
literature  on  REITs  that  has  recently  developed  due  to  the  increasing  popularity  of  these  investment 
instruments among investors. 
REITs are usually closed-end funds. Hence, most articles focus on the closed-end fund discount puzzle (Lee 
et al. 1991; Malkiel 1995; Dimson and Minio-Kozerski 1999). REIT discount can be explained by size, 
leverage, concentration (in terms of sector and location), and overhead expenses (Capozza and Lee 1995), 
presence of outside directors (Friday and Sirmans 1998), ownership structure (Friday and Sirmans 1998; 
Capozza and Seguin 2003), entrepreneurial ability of the fund management (Adams and Venmore-Rowland 
1990), and investor overreaction (Barkham and Ward 1999). 
Some other contributions focus on REIT performances and their determinants. Earlier studies focus on the 
performances of US REITs (Kuhle et al. 1986; Firstenberg et al. 1988; Chan et al. 1990; Sagalyn 1990; 
Peterson and Hsieh 2003). Recent studies find small abnormal returns in international real estate markets 
(Ling and Naranjo 2002; Bond et al. 2003). REIT performances are generally explained by momentum, size, 
turnover and analyst coverage (Chui et al. 2003), diversification and liquidity effects (Capozza and Seguin 
1999), external  advisory  contracts  (Capozza  and  Seguin  2000), insider  ownership (Capozza  and  Seguin 
2003; Han 2006), institutional ownership (Wang et al. 1995), and independent boards (Ghosh and Sirmans 
2003; Feng et al. 2005). 
Jenkins (1980), Fletcher and Diskin (1994) and Capozza and Seguin (2000) study the interrelations between 
fee structure and debt policy. Compensating Management Companies on total asset value is an incentive for 
them to increase the fund asset value by means of debt issues (even beyond any consideration on the optimal 
capital structure). 
Our study focuses on this stream of research and asserts that REIT fee structures drive not only Management 
Company financial decisions but also their trading policy. Our model shows that performance fees paid on 
the fund market value align the Management Company and shareholder interests. Conversely, management 
fees paid on NAV or GAV lead Management Companies to suboptimal financing and investment decisions 
in order to receive more fees. 
To test our model, we use data on the Italian REITs during the period between 2006 and 2009. Concentrating 
on Italian funds provides us with an ideal setting for the analysis of the interrelation between REIT fee 
structure and management decisions. 
•  Italian families are characterized by a high propensity for real estate investments
1. According to a 
Bank of Italy survey (2009), 61% of an Italian family’s total assets are represented by real estate 
                                                      
1 In 2008, the real estate division represented 19.5% of the Italian GDP. 3 
investments. In Italy, the ratio of real estate investments to disposable income is 4. In France and 
Germany this ratio is equal to 2.5 and 3.1 respectively. 
•  Despite the importance of the real estate sector in Italy, empirical results on REITs are still missing 
(a few exceptions are Benedetto and Morri 2009; Biasin et al. 2010; Biasin and Quaranta 2010; Lee 
and Morri 2009). 
•  The fee structure is usually considered in the framework of agency problems (Fletcher and Diskin 
1994; Capozza and Seguin 2000; Alshimmiri 2004). Several studies denounce low protection and a 
high exposure to expropriation risk for the Italian (minority) shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998; 
Melis 2000; Bigelli and Mengoli 2004). In this context, REIT shareholder interests may not be 
effectively safeguarded. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a theoretical model for the REIT fee structure; section 
3 describes the empirical setup used to test the theoretical model; section 4 states a set of testable hypotheses 
and presents the results of our empirical analysis; section 5 draws the conclusions. 
 2  Theoretical model 
In this section, we present a model, which forms the basis of our regression analysis. 
Management Companies are in charge of making investment and financing decisions in the interests of 
shareholders.  As  in  all  corporations,  the  separation  of  ownership  (REIT  shareholders)  and  control 
(Management Company) often leads to agency problems. Agency problems occur when managers have an 
incentive to pursue their own interests instead of shareholder interests (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling  1976).  Several  academics  have  suggested  mechanisms  to  prevent  managers  from  maximizing 
solely their own utility (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Agrawal and Mandelker 1987). 
These devices can be either external (such as the market for corporate control) or internal (such as a board of 
directors  or  managerial  remuneration).  Unfortunately,  if  these  devices  are  not  well  calibrated,  manager 
decisions can be distorted and agency problems intensified. Our work is based on this consideration. We 
analyze how the REIT fee structure can induce the Management Company to make suboptimal investment 
and financing decisions, from a shareholder’s perspective. 




+ ∈R D , policies. 
•  On one hand,  I  optimal level can be obtained ordering investments by their incremental rate of return 
and then taking on the investments until the incremental rate of return is greater or equal to the capital 
market  rate.  If  the  incremental  rate  of  return  on  investments  is  below  the  capital  market  rate,  the 
Management  Company  should  distribute  cash  to  the  REIT  shareholders  instead  of  investing  it:  the 
owners are better off by investing the cash directly in the capital market. 
•  On the other hand,  D is the optimal level of debt that coincides with the minimum point on the cost of 
capital curve. If a fund is financed at a less than the optimal level of debt, the Management Company can 
                                                      
2 The model can also be expressed in terms of net investments. In that case,  R I ∈ . 4 
raise the fund value by increasing  D (thus, lowering the cost of capital). This point is in contrast to the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem (1958) on capital structure and coherent with the traditional view (Durand 
1959; Robichek and Myers 1966; Stiglitz 1974). More specifically, capital structure is important because 
several deviations from perfect market conditions may occur in the real world. 
To operationalize these concepts, let  ( ) D I v ,  be twice continuously diﬀerentiable strictly concave on the 
non-negative orthant with an interior maximum. We can use an additively separable function for simplicity, 
( ) ( ) ( ) D v I v D I v
2 1 , + = .  [1] 

























,  [2] 
where  I v  and  D v  indicate partial derivatives evaluated at the point in which v reaches its maximum value, 
( ) * *,D I . 
Another characteristic of REITs, which is important in developing our model, is the NAV. The NAV is the 
net fair value of the fund determined periodically (usually every six months) by independent experts. The 
NAV represents the fundamental value of the REIT and for this reason it should be in line with the fund 
market value. However, the empirical evidence presented in the introduction section shows that REITs are 
generally quoted at a discount from NAV. This discount is sometimes huge. 
In general, it is reasonable to think that independent experts evaluate the fund on the basis of the investments 
made  by  the  Management  Company.  As  long  as  the  independent  experts  believe  that  the  Management 
Company chooses investments which have an incremental rate of return above the capital market rate, their 
valuation of NAV increases, otherwise their valuation of NAV decreases
3. Thus, we assume the NAV to be a 
concave function of I ,  ( ) I n . Finally, the GAV can be obtained as an accounting identity by summing NAV 
and debt,  ( ) ( ) D I n D I g + = , . 
The Management Company should choose the level of  I  and  D that maximizes shareholder wealth, i.e., 
* I  and  * D . However, if the REIT fee structure does not align the Management Company and shareholder 
interests, the formers may be tempted to choose  I  and  D so that their wealth is maximized, i.e., 
M I  and 
M D . 
                                                      
3 Obviously, if we considered the time effect in a dynamic model, which we do not do, the valuation of NAV could 
change because of changing economic conditions. 5 
In general, REIT fees can be categorized in two main classes: management fees and performance fees
4. 
•  Management fees are generally paid once a year (sometimes twice) as a fixed percentage of NAV or 
GAV. 
•  Performance fees are generally composed of periodic fees (usually paid once a year) and final fees (paid 
at the end of the fund life). They are based on agreed measures of performance, generally expressed as a 
function of the fund internal rate of return or market value
5. In reality, in some cases performance fees 
are sometimes paid on NAV or GAV. In this circumstance, there is not a significant difference between 
management and performance fees. For this reason, in our model we only consider performance fees that 
are paid on the fund market value. 
Since the REIT fee structure may differ among funds, there are at least three possible cases to consider for 
the Management Company objective function. In the first case, the Management Company receives only a 
performance fee paid on the fund market value (case 1). In the second and third case, the Management 
Company receives both a performance fee and a management fee either on NAV (case 2) or GAV (case 3). 
•  Case 1 – The Management Company receives only a performance fee,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ π  
The Management Company objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] D v I v D I m
2 1 ; , + = π π .  [3] 

























.  [4] 
As both members of the previous two expressions can be divided by π  without affecting the results, the 
FOCs of this problem are identical to those in system [2] and the following observation is straightforward. 
•  Observation 1 – If the Management Company receives only a performance fee on the fund market 
value, the Management Company and shareholder interests are aligned, and the Management Company 
chooses the optimal level of investment and debt.  
Thus, in case 1,  * I I
M =  and  * D D
M = . 
•  Case 2 – The Management Company receives a performance fee,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ π , and a management fee 
on NAV,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ φ  
The Management Company objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) I n D v I v D I m φ π φ π + + =
2 1 , ; , .  [5] 
Since m  is a sum of a strictly concave function and a concave function, it is a strictly concave function.  
Thus, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for maximizing m  are, 
                                                      
4 To be more precise, REITs pay other types of expenses to maintain their operations (e.g., depositary fees, publication 
fees and legal fees). However, we do not consider these fees in our model. 
5 REIT prospectuses often indicate an explicit target hurdle rate. 6 
































  [6] 
The optimal choice of 
M I  and 
M D  depends on the value of the parameter φ . To determine how 
M I  and 
M D  respond to changes in φ , we differentiate the FOCs with respect to φ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )









































































,  [7] 
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the point ( )
M M D I , . 












, we have 
( )
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.  [8] 



















 is always null. The following observation is then straightforward. 
•  Observation 2 – If the Management Company receives a performance fee on the fund market value and 
a management fee on NAV, the Management Company and shareholder interests are, in general, not 















. The Management Company chooses the optimal level of 







. However, the level of debt is at its optimal value. 







 means that if the fund market value and NAV are maximized at the same point
6, 
the management fee is irrelevant for the investment policy. 
•  Case 3 – The Management Company receives a performance fee,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ π , and a management fee 
on GAV,  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ φ  
                                                      
6 This is because the objective function is additive. 7 
The Management Company objective function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] D I n D v I v D I m + + + = φ π φ π
2 1 , ; , .  [9] 
Also in this case m  is strictly concave. 
Thus, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for maximizing m  are, 































.  [10] 
The optimal choice of 
M I  and 
M D  depends on the value of the parameter φ . To determine how 
M I  and 
M D  respond to changes in φ , we differentiate the FOCs with respect to φ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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, we have 
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. Since m  is strictly concave, 
0 < DD m . Thus, in this case the level of debt is suboptimal and always increases in  φ . The following 
observation is thus straightforward. 
•  Observation 3 – If the Management Company receives a performance fee on the fund market value and 
a management fee on GAV, the Management Company and shareholder interests are not aligned. The 























. The level of debt is always too high. 
Furthermore, observing the first equations of system [8] and [12], the next observation follows. 8 
•  Observation 4 – If the Management Company receives a performance fee on the fund market value and 
a management fee based on NAV or GAV, the level of investment is not affected by the choice of the 
base for the management fee (GAV or NAV). 
It is evident from the previous analysis that only performance fees are specifically designed to reduce agency 
conflicts: only maximizing the shareholder wealth by means of optimal investment and financing decisions, 
the Management Company maximizes the performance fee amount it receives. In contrast, management fees 
may lead Management Companies to opportunistic behaviors. The model suggests that the Management 
Company assumes more debts when management fees are paid on GAV (and not on NAV), and tends to 
choose an (equal) suboptimal level of investment either case of a management fee paid on GAV or NAV. 
 3  Empirical setup 
To test our theoretical model empirically, we use a panel dataset of Italian REITs. In this section, we briefly 
review the main characteristics of the most common panel estimators (Baltagi 2005; Verbeek 2008). 
The standard model used in many empirical cases is 
T t N i u y it it it , , 1 ; , , 1 ' K K = = + + = β x α ,  [13] 
where  it y  is the response variable for the unit  i at time  t, α  is a scalar,  β is a  1 × k  vector of partial 
effects, and  it x  is a  1 × k  vector of covariates. In most applications, it is common to choose a one-way error 
component model for the disturbances,  it u , that is 
it i it u ν   + = ,  [14] 
where  i    denotes an unobservable time-constant unit effect and  it ν  indicates an idiosyncratic error term. 
There are several classes of panel models that can be used in empirical research. The most common choices 
are the Between (BE), the Fixed Effects (FE), the OLS and the Random Effects (RE) model. 
•  The BE estimator exploits the between dimension of the data (differences between individuals). The BE 
estimator is consistent if the covariates are strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with the unobservable 
time-constant unit effects. 
•  The  FE  estimator  uses  the  within  dimension  of  the  data  (differences  within  individuals).  The  FE 
estimator requires the covariates to be strictly exogenous, but does not impose any restriction on the 
correlation between explanatory variables and unobservable time-constant unit effects. The FE model 
has the attraction of needing weaker assumptions than those needed by other estimators.  
•  The OLS estimator exploits both the within and the between dimensions of the data, but not efficiently. 
Consistency of this estimator requires the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated with the unobservable 
time-constant unit effects and the idiosyncratic error term. 
•  The RE estimator uses both the within and the between dimensions of the data efficiently. Consistency 
requires all the covariates to be strictly exogenous and independent of the unobserved time-constant unit 
effects, a condition that rarely holds in economic applications. 9 
 4  Empirical results 
 4.1  Description of the variables 
We base our empirical analysis on a sample composed of all the 22 Italian listed REITs. We collected all the 
data from the compulsory half-year reports that all funds published in the 4-year interval 2006-2009. Starting 
from the second half of 2006, the total number of observations is 154. In what follows, we propose a short 
description of the variables we use in the subsequent regression analysis. 
( ) it debt ln   is the natural logarithm of the total debt of the fund i at time t. The average value 
of the total debt (in levels) for all REITs is 128.59 million Euros; the standard 
deviation is 133.06 million Euros. 
it inv   is  the  value  of  net  investments  (in  millions)  of  the  fund  i,  defined  as  the 
difference  between  asset  investments  and  disposals  realized  at  time  t.  The 
average  value  of  net  investments  for  all  REITs  is  -7.96  million  Euros;  the 
standard deviation is 42.77 million Euros
7. 
i gavfees   is a dummy variable equal to 1 if management fees are paid on GAV and 0 
otherwise (i.e., paid on NAV). 45.45% of REITs have a management fee paid on 
GAV. 
( ) it nav ln   is the natural logarithm of the NAV of the fund i at time t. The average value of 
the NAV (in levels) for all REITs is 270.87 million Euros; the standard deviation 
is 118.14 million Euros. 
it fetime residualli   is the residual time to maturity expressed in years of the fund i at time t. The 
average  residual  time  to  maturity  in  2009  for  all  REITs  is  11.05  years;  the 
standard deviation is 3.33 years. 
 4.2  Regression analysis 
This section reports the results of our regression analysis. Before each regression model, we present an 
exploratory panel plot of the relationship between the response variable and the explanatory variable of 
interest (Peng 2008). 
It is worth noting that not all the observations presented in section 2 can be tested empirically using the 
sample of Italian REITs. Observation 1 and observation 2 cannot be tested because all the Italian REITs 
exhibit both performance fees and management fees. Testing these observations would require a sample of 
funds that did not exhibit any management fees. The third and fourth observations, however, may be tested 
using available data. 
                                                      
7 In the theoretical model, investments were supposed to take only non-negative values. Investments as defined here, 
however, can take both positive and negative values. This difference, however, is irrelevant, because the theoretical 
model can be easily generalized considering investments that can assume any real values,  R I ∈ , leaving all the 
implications of the model unchanged. 10 
The first hypothesis we want to test posits that: 
•  Hypothesis 1 (H1) – If management fees are paid on GAV rather than on NAV, the REIT is more 
indebted. 
As a first naïve test of H1, figure 1 plots the debt-to-GAV ratio. The figure is divided in three panels. In the 
central  panel,  the  time  series  observations  of  each  REIT  are  discretized  and  assigned  to  distinct  color 
categories:  light  colors  indicate  low  values,  dark  colors  indicate  high  values.  The  black  horizontal  line 
divides the funds in two groups: GAV-fee-based funds are on the top, NAV-fee-based funds are on the 
bottom. REITs on the top present a higher level of debt: a result in line with H1. The right hand side panel 
shows boxplots of the time series data of each fund. Again, GAV-fee-based funds exhibit a higher level of 
debt than NAV-fee-based funds. The bottom panel illustrates mean values of debt-to-GAV ratio across all 
REITs for each time point and shows an upward trend in the level of debt. This upward trend can be 
explained in terms of asset disposals: as REITs approach their maturity, asset disposals increase, GAV 
reduces and the debt-to-GAV ratio increases. An alternative story is that since REITs are characterized by a 
high debt capacity, they benefited from the cut in interest rates as part of the expansive monetary policy 
pursued by the European Central Bank to counteract the financial crisis.  
[Figure 1] 
As a more formal test of H1, we propose a panel regression analysis on the model 
( ) ( ) it it it i it u fetime residualli nav gavfees debt + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln ln β β β β .  [15] 
In this model,  i gavfees  is the explanatory variable of interest, while  ( ) it nav ln  and  it fetime residualli  are 
control variables. Table 1 shows the results applying four estimators: BE, FE, OLS, RE. The BE and the FE 
estimators are given in the first two columns of table. Since the FE estimator eliminates any time-invariant 
variables from the model, the effects of fees on GAV are removed. The OLS and the RE estimators are given 
in the last two columns of the table.  
If the individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, all estimators are consistent and the 
RE estimator is the most efficient. If the individual effects are correlated with some covariates, the FE 
estimator is the only one that is consistent. To choose between the RE and FE estimator, we perform the 
Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees 
of freedom. Considering the value of the test statistic (2.11, p-value = 0.35), we propend for the RE estimator 
which is consistent and efficient. 
As expected, the coefficient on  i gavfees  is positive in all models: Management Companies tend to assume 
more debts when management fees are paid on GAV than they do when these fees are paid on NAV. This 
effect is very statistically significant
8. 
As  expected, the  FE  estimator  has  the largest  within  R-squared,  while the  BE  and the  OLS  estimators 
maximize  the  between  and  the  overall  R-squared  respectively.  Wald  test  statistics  (not  reported)  are 
calculated for all models to test for the hypothesis that all coefficients in the model except the intercept are 
                                                      
8 All our inference is based on robust standard errors and results are double-checked with both bootstrap and jackknife 
standard errors. For brevity, we omit these results. 11 
equal to zero. All tests lead to rejecting the hypothesis that the conditional mean of the response variable is 
constant and independent of covariates. 
[Table 1] 
The second hypothesis we want to test posits that: 
•  Hypothesis 2 (H2) – The level of investments is not related to the base on which the management 
fee is paid (GAV or NAV). 
In this case, figure 2 plots the net investment-to-NAV ratio. As expected, the distinction between GAV-fee-
based funds and NAV-fee-based funds seems to play no role for Management Company investment choices: 
in the central panel, REITs appear to be randomly distributed between the top and the bottom group. In the 
right hand side panel, the overall level of investments and the within-fund ranges of variation are similar 
across the 22 funds. The bottom panel shows the trend in the level of investments: investments decrease in 
the period 2007-2008. This downward trend can be explained in terms of asset disposals: as REITs approach 
their maturity, asset disposals increase and the investment-to-NAV ratio decreases. An alternative story is 
that investments decrease as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
[Figure 2] 
The regression model to test H2 is 
( ) it it it i it u fetime residualli nav gavfees inv + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ln β β β β .  [16] 
Table 2 presents the results. According to the Hausman test (0.51, p-value 0.77), we favor the RE estimator. 
Coherently to H2, the coefficient on  i gavfees  is now not statistically different from zero (in all models). We 
conclude that the base of management fees is not related to investment decisions. 
[Table 2] 
 5  Conclusions 
REITs represent one of the most important instruments to convoy investor savings toward the real estate 
industry for several reasons. 
•  While direct real estate investments require a high fixed amount of capital to be undertaken and are 
usually a prerogative of specialized investors, listed REITs allow properties to be parceled out and, 
hence, to loosen the bond suffered by potential retail and small institutional investors. 
•  Furthermore, listed REITs allow investors to diversify their portfolio and to select a product which 
combines  the  typical  features  of  a  financial  instrument  with  the  characteristics  of  real  estate 
investments (e.g., stable dividend yields and protection against inflation). 
REITs  are  managed  by  Management  Companies.  Management  Companies  should  make  financing  and 
investment decisions to maximize shareholder wealth. However, if the fund fee structure does not align the 
Management Company and shareholder interests, the former may be tempted to make suboptimal choices to 
maximize their own wealth. This agency conflict is a cost for investors who could be enticed to move toward 
other financial instruments. Thus, in order to make these instruments even more attractive for investors, the 
fee structure should be designed to direct management effort toward shareholder value maximization and, 12 
therefore, to reduce agency costs. This paper has focused on this aspect, developing a theoretical model and 
then testing it. 
The main prediction of the theoretical model can be summarized as follows. 
•  Performance  fees  on  the  fund  market  value  align  the  Management  Company  and  shareholder 
interests. 
•  Management fees on GAV lead Management Companies to assume too much debt. 
•  Management fees (either on NAV or GAV) lead Management Companies to choose a suboptimal 
level of investment. 
We  tested  this  model  on  the  Italian  REITs.  Our  findings  show  that  the  fund  is  more  indebted  when 
management fees are paid on GAV rather than on NAV. Furthermore, the level of investments does not seem 
to  be  related  to  the  base  (GAV  or  NAV)  of  management  fees.  With  regards  to  these  two  aspects,  the 
theoretical model is therefore supported by the data. Thus, expressing fees on market values (and not on 
NAV or GAV) appears to be a pursuable solution to align the Management Company and investor interests
9. 
Since our model is based on fairly general assumptions, its predictions can also be applied to other contexts 
and countries. For this reason, further empirical studies are needed to test this model on other markets. In 
particular, even if the Italian market of REITs can be considered an ideal setting for the empirical analysis of 
the interrelation between fund fee structure and management decisions, empirical analyses on other countries 
would make it possible to test the other theoretical observations that we have not been able to test with 
Italian data. Research is currently underway to provide this empirical test. 
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Table 1 – The table presents the results of the regression analysis.  ( ) it debt ln  is the natural logarithm of the 
total debt of the fund i at time t.  i gavfees  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if management fees are paid on 
GAV and 0 otherwise (i.e., paid on NAV).  ( ) it nav ln  is the natural logarithm of the NAV of the fund i at 
time t.  it fetime residualli  is the residual time to maturity expressed in years of the fund i at time t. The total 
number  of  observations  is  154.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
  Dependent Variable:  ( ) it debt ln  
Variables  Between  Fixed Effects  OLS  Random Effects 
Constant  0.430  10.187**  4.363  8.759*** 
  (11.240)  (3.876)  (6.412)  (2.899) 
i gavfees   1.557***  -  1.539***  1.452*** 
  (0.336)    (0.293)  (0.321) 
( ) it nav ln   0.871  0.439*  0.685*  0.473*** 
  (0.579)  (0.227)  (0.331)  (0.167) 
it fetime residualli   0.012  -0.113  -0.044  -0.096 
  (0.070)  (0.105)  (0.067)  (0.080) 
within R-squared  0.005  0.049  0.020  0.048 
between R-squared  0.662  0.306  0.653  0.626 
overall R-squared  0.564  0.279  0.576  0.564 
 17 
Table 2 – The table presents the results of the regression analysis.  it inv  is the value of net investments (in 
millions) of the fund i, defined as the difference between asset investments and disposals realized at time t. 
i gavfees  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if management fees are paid on GAV and 0 otherwise (i.e., paid on 
NAV).  ( ) it nav ln  is the natural logarithm of the NAV of the fund i at time t.  it fetime residualli  is the 
residual time to maturity expressed in years of the fund i at time t. The total number of observations is 154. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
10%.  
  Dependent Variable:  it inv  
Variables  Between  Fixed Effects  OLS  Random Effects 
Constant  302.738*  265.516  261.769*  248.047 
  (162.334)  (293.851)  (147.212)  (156.991) 
i gavfees   0.990  -  1.589  2.282 
  (9.332)    (9.058)  (9.118) 
( ) it nav ln   -16.428*  -15.233  -14.558*  -13.951* 
  (8.357)  (15.554)  (7.799)  (8.358) 
it fetime residualli   2.035  4.605  2.822*  3.137** 
  (2.285)  (2.881)  (1.551)  (1.533) 
within R-squared  0.013  0.021  0.019  0.020 
between R-squared  0.238  0.216  0.233  0.228 
overall R-squared  0.080  0.080  0.083  0.082 
  18 
Figure 1 – This figure plots the debt-to-GAV ratio. The figure is divided in three panels. In the central panel, 
the time series observations of each fund are discretized and assigned to distinct color categories: light colors 
indicate low values, dark colors indicate high values. The black horizontal line divides funds in GAV-fee-
based  funds  (on  the  top)  and  NAV-fee-based  funds  (on  the  bottom).  On  the  right  hand  side  panel  are 
boxplots of the time series value of each REIT and on the bottom panel are mean values across all the time 






































Figure 2 – This figure plots the net investment-to-NAV ratio. The figure is divided in three panels. In the 
central  panel,  the  time  series  observations  of  each  fund  are  discretized  and  assigned  to  distinct  color 
categories:  light  colors  indicate  low  values,  dark  colors  indicate  high  values.  The  black  horizontal  line 
divides funds in GAV-fee-based funds (on the top) and NAV-fee-based funds (on the bottom). On the right 
hand side panel are boxplots of the time series value of each REIT and on the bottom panel are mean values 
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